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A general method for mining discourse for 
occurrences of the rules of inference would 
be useful in a variety of natural language 
processing applications.  The method 
described here has its roots in Rhetorical 
Structure Theory (RST).  An RST analysis 
of a rule of inference can be used as an 
exemplar to produce a relational complex 
in the form of a nested relational 
proposition.  This relational complex can 
be transformed into a logical expression 
using the logic of relational propositions.  
The expression can then be generalized as 
a logical signature for use in logic-mining 
discourse for instances of the rule.  
Generalized logical signatures reached in 
this manner appear to be grounded in 
identifiable logical relationships with their 
respective rules of inference.   Thus, from a 
text, it is possible to identify a rhetorical 
structure, and from the structure, a 
relational proposition, and from the 
relational proposition, a generalized logical 
signature, and from the signature, the rule 
of inference residing within the text. The 
focus in this paper is on modus tollens and 
its variants, but the method is extensible to 
other rules as well.   
1 Introduction 
Recognizing occurrences of rules of inference in 
discourse is difficult for humans and computers 
alike.  A method for doing so would be valuable for 
natural language processing, discourse analysis, 
and studies in logic and argumentation. Potter 
(2018)  showed that some standard rules, including 
modus ponens, disjunctive syllogism, and some 
basic logical operations are directly accessible 
using Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST).  This 
arises as a result of direct mappings between RST 
relations, corresponding relational propositions, 
and the rules of inference.  For others there is no 
direct correspondence.  This is because the rules of 
inference rules tend to manifest, not as individual 
relations, but as relational complexes, which may 
be embedded within deeply nested relational 
propositions.   
This paper provides a description of a method 
for using RST to discover occurrences of modus 
tollens in natural discourse.  The paper will extend 
this method to biconditional elimination, 
particularly as it relates to valid forms of denying 
the antecedent.  Identifying relational complexes 
associated with these rules will support the 
specification of generalized logical signatures that 
can be used in logic-mining texts. While the 
method defined here is limited to modus tollens 
and its variants, it provides guidance for 
investigating other rules of inference, such as 
hypothetical syllogism and dilemma, and may lead 
to a general methodology for signature-based logic 
mining.  This also suggests the possibility of 
discovering rules of inference present in discourse 
but not recognized in the literature of classical 
logic. 
The approach described here presumes the 
availability of RST analyses, created, either 
interactively using tools such as O’Donnell’s 
(1997) RSTTool or Zeldes’ (2016) rstWeb, or 
computationally (e.g., Corston-Oliver, 1998; 
Hernault, Prendinger, duVerle, & Ishizuka, 2010; 
Pardo, Nunes, & Rino, 2004; Soricut & Marcu, 
2003).  These RST analyses may be restated as 
nested relational propositions, and these 
propositions can be used to generate the underlying 
logical organization of the text (Potter, 2018).  
Discovery of inference rule instantiations within 
this logical expression proceeds by aligning logical 
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signatures with structural constituents of the 
comprehensive expression. 
Lest there be any confusion as to the scope of 
this study, note that the objective here is not to 
develop a system of reasoning based on linguistic 
form, as in natural logic (MacCartney & Manning, 
2009; Van Benthem, 1986), nor is it concerned with 
the logical forms of imperatives, questions, and 
statements, nor with the relationship between 
grammar and reasoning (Lakoff, 1970).  The scope 
of this study concerns the discovery of occurrences 
of rules of inference as presented in discourse, as 
manifested in rhetorical structures, and with 
particular focus on modus tollens.  Consistent with 
the fundamentals of RST, it is a logic of intended 
effect.  
The remaining sections of this paper are as 
follows.  First, a brief review of RST is presented 
using an analysis of a relevant example.  This is 
followed by an overview of the logic of relational 
propositions, showing how complexes of nested 
relational propositions provide the basis for logical 
signatures useful in logic mining.  Four generalized 
signatures for modus tollens are discussed, 
consisting of canonical, evidential, biconditional, 
and antithetical signatures.  This includes a brief 
analysis concerning inference rule identification 
for incomplete relational complexes.  Following 
this analysis is an explanation for how the logical 
signatures derived from discourse can be used to 
validate the rules of inference they serve to 
instantiate.  The paper concludes with a discussion 
of the results and directions for future study.  
Relevant literature will be cited in passim. 
2 RST Analysis of a Relevant Example 
Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) is an account 
of textual coherence (Mann & Thompson, 1988).  
It is used for describing texts in terms of the 
relations that hold among the text spans comprising 
the text.  An RST relation consists of three parts: a 
satellite, a nucleus, and a relation.  The satellite and 
nucleus are text spans, which are either elementary 
discourse units or subordinate RST relations.  The 
distinction between satellite and nucleus arises as a 
result of the asymmetry of the relations.  Within a 
relation, the nucleus is more salient than the 
satellite.  A key consideration in defining nuclearity 
is the concept of locus of intended effect.   The 
locus of intended effect may be in the nucleus, the 
satellite, or shared between the two.  Locating the 
effect is important for the logical analysis of RST 
relations, particularly in implicative relations 
where the locus of intended effect will usually be 
the implicand (Potter, 2018). 
Figure 1 shows an example of an RST analysis.  
The text is a short passage from J. L. Austin’s 
translation of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic 
(1884/1980, p. 37).  The text presents an argument 
against the claim that numbers are merely ideas 
without objective reality.  Frege begins by stating 
that he disagrees with a claim made by the 
mathematician Oskar Schlömilch, that numbers are 
ideas, not things.  Frege supports his statement first 
by conceding that if numbers were merely ideas, 
then mathematics would be part of psychology.  
The CONDITION relation is used to indicate the 
dependency of the nucleus on the satellite. But this 
conditional is rejected using a comparison of 
mathematics with astronomy.  This analogy is used 
as EVIDENCE for rejecting Schlömilch’s position.  
That Frege’s argument is an application of modus 
tollens 
(((p → q)  ¬q) → ¬p) 
and that the RST structure presented here maps to 
the rule of inference may be intuitively apparent.  
However, as will be developed in this paper, this 
need not, and in most cases cannot, be merely a 
matter of intuition.  
3 The Logic of Relational Propositions 
It has been argued that Rhetorical Structure Theory 
is incapable of representing inferential patterns, 
because argumentative and rhetorical relations are 
said to be orthogonal to one another, and because 
RST relations provide little or no indication of 
alignment with the rules of inference (Budzynska, 
Janier, Reed, & Saint-Dizier, 2016).  However, the 
structure of an RST analysis reflects the structure 
of its argument.  EVIDENCE is evidential, 
MOTIVATION is motivational, and ENABLEMENT is 
 





enabling.  This would suggest the logic and 
reasoning are not too far below the surface.  As 
shown by Potter (2018), for any RST relation there 
is a corresponding logical form, and these forms 
combine to construct logical expressions that map 
to RST tree structures and serve as logical 
interpretations of the organization of a text.  The 
approach used for deriving these interpretations is 
based on discourse entities known as relational 
propositions.  Relational propositions are implicit 
assertions that arise between clauses within a text 
and are essential to the effective functioning of the 
text (Mann & Thompson, 1986a, 1986b, 2000).  
RST and relational propositions provide parallel 
accounts of discourse coherence.  While RST 
identifies structures of coherence relations among 
the spans within a text, relational propositions treat 
these relations as implicit relational acts that 
account for how the text functions (Mann & 
Thompson, 1986b).   
A relational proposition consists of a predicate 
and a pair of discourse units.  The predicate 
corresponds to the RST relation, and the units 
correspond to the satellite and nucleus.  In this 
paper relational propositions are specified using a 
functional notation.  This permits concise 
representation of nested relational propositions. 
For example, the relational proposition for the RST 
analysis of the Frege argument shown in Figure 1 
is as follows: 
evidence(concession(condition(2,3),4),1) 
where each elementary discourse unit is identified 
numerically in order of appearance in the text.  
Each relational predicate is associated with a 
logical form.  In the above relational proposition, 
the condition predicate is defined as material 
implication,  (s → n).  The satellite materially 
implies the nucleus.  Granted, there are persuasive 
arguments in favor of treating condition as 
biconditional (e.g., Geis & Zwicky, 1971; Horn, 
2000; Karttunen, 1971; Moeschler, 2018; van der 
Auwera, 1997a, 1997b); however, for the purpose 
of logic mining the biconditional interpretation of 
condition will frequently be unnecessary, and 
preserving the distinction conditional and 
biconditional can be a useful. 
With the CONCESSION predicate, the writer 
acknowledges a perceived incompatibility between 
the situations presented in the satellite and nucleus 
and uses this acknowledgement to forestall 
objections that might otherwise have arisen as a 
result of the perceived incompatibility.  By pre-
empting the objection, the writer smooths the way 
to increasing the reader’s positive regard for the 
situation presented in the nucleus. Logically then, 
we can say that it is not the case that the satellite 
provides grounds for rejecting the nucleus: ¬(s → 
¬n).  Upon neutralizing this objection, the writer 
further invites the reader to infer from this the 
claim presented by the nucleus. The reasoning thus 
becomes an instance of modus ponens in which the 
condition of the major premise is a negated 
conditional statement: 
(((¬(s → ¬n) → n)  ¬(s → ¬n)) → n) 
With the EVIDENCE predicate, the satellite 
provides evidence in support of the nucleus.  For 
the relation to achieve its intended effect, the reader 
must accept the satellite and recognize its 
implicative relationship with the nucleus. If the 
antecedent is believable, the consequent will also 
be believable.  To achieve its effect, EVIDENCE 
requires that the antecedent (i.e. the satellite) be 
asserted.  Hence the logical form of EVIDENCE is 
modus ponens: 
(((s → n)  s) → n) 
The three logical forms (condition, concession, 
and evidence), corresponding to the relations used 
in the Frege analysis,  can be used to construct the 
logical expression of the nested relational 
proposition, which expands to the following valid 
argument: 
((((((¬((2 → 3) → ¬4) → 4)  ¬((2 → 3) → ¬4)) 
→ 4) → 1)  (((¬((2 → 3) → ¬4) → 4)  ¬((2 
→ 3) → ¬4)) → 4)) → 1) 
Using this technique, it is possible to generate 
logical expressions for any RST analysis.  While 
the resulting expressions can be complex, they are 
constructed from the simple logical forms defined 
for each of the relational predicates. As will be 
detailed in Section 4, these forms are generalizable 
as logical signatures that may be used in mining 
texts for occurrences of  rules of inference. 
Note that discourse units used in relational 
propositions need not be truth-functional in the 
restrictive sense of the term. Although it is 
common practice present logic in terms of truth 
values and truth functions, these semantics are 
arbitrary, and we could just as well speak of on and 
off,  + and -, 1 and 0, yes and no, open and closed, 
satisfiability and unsatisfiability, or any other 




disbelief, positive and negative regard, desire and 
indifference, interest and disinterest, understanding 
and misunderstanding, or ability and inability.  To 
the extent that the primitives of RST can be 
understood in terms of bivalent values, they are 
amenable to logical treatment.   
4 Relational Complexes 
As noted earlier, some inference rules manifest as 
single relational predicate, but this is not always the 
case.  Modus tollens requires multiple predicates, 
and these predicates may be combined in various 
ways.  Each of these combinations, for any given 
instance, is a relational complex.  A relational 
complex may then be generalized and normalized 
to create a signature, or logical pattern that may 
then be used to locate other instances of the rule in 
discourse.  
The generalization process consists in replacing 
the numeric unit identifiers with normalized  
alphabetic variables. Normalization consists in 
identifying discourse units that are sufficiently 
similar semantically to indicate material 
equivalence or negation.  This paper makes no 
attempt to define a technology for measuring 
semantic textual similarity.  There are already 
numerous research efforts in that area.  For 
example, Finch, Hwang, and Sumita (2005) 
repurposed machine translation evaluation 
methods to determine sentence-level semantic 
equivalence, Tsatsaronis, Varlamis, and 
Vazirgiannis (2010) developed a measure of 
semantic relatedness which capitalizes on a word-
to-word semantic relatedness measure and 
extended it to measure the relatedness between 
texts, and Sultan, Bethard, and Sumner (2015) 
developed supervised and unsupervised systems 
for measuring sentence similarity.  Addressing 
negation detection, Basile, Bos, Evang, and 
Venhuizen (2012) used discourse representation 
structures for negation detection, and Harabagiu, 
Hickl, and Lacatusu (2006) interpreted negation 
using a combination of overt and indirectly 
licensed negation.  For the present study, 
normalizations are hand-crafted. Thus, for the 
generalized signature 
((((((¬((p → q) → ¬r) → r)  ¬((p → q) → ¬r)) 
→ r) → s)  (((¬((p → q) → ¬r) → r)  ¬((p → 
q) → ¬r)) → r)) → s) 
the normalized logical form, with double negations 
removed is: 
((((((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)  ¬((p → q) → q)) 
→ ¬q) → ¬p)  (((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)  
¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q)) → ¬p) 
We can use this logical form as a template for 
identifying comparable relational propositions 
within texts, keeping in mind that any of the 
elements of the expression may refer recursively to 
lower level complex expressions.  To the extent 
that the comparisons align, the logical expressions 
for each relational proposition will comprise the 
sought-after relational complexes, which provide 
the basis for the logical signature.   
5 Canonical Modus Tollens 
Modus tollens is a valid argument of the form: 
(((p → q)  ¬q) → ¬p) 
The categorical premise (¬q) denies the 
consequent of the conditional premise, implying 
the negation of the antecedent (¬p).  Figure 2 
shows an RST analysis of a Wikipedia example of 
modus tollens. As shown, the writer concedes that 
the conditional relationship between Rex as a 
chicken and Rex as a bird holds, but rejects the 
proposition that he is a bird.  From this, we may 
reason, Rex is no chicken. The relational 
proposition for this structure is  
condition(conjunction(condition(1,2),3),4) 
And the relational complex for this proposition 
therefore is: 
(((1 → 2)  3) → 4) 
This may be generalized and normalized to 
(((p → q)  ¬q) → ¬p) 
which is modus tollens.  Stated canonically, the 
RST relations are subject matter, rather than 
presentational, because there is no intent to 
influence an inclination in the reader.  In practice, 
however, modus tollens is commonly used as an 
 





act of persuasion.  This leads to the evidential and 
antithetical signatures for modus tollens. 
6 Evidential Modus Tollens 
When the writer uses modus tollens with the intent 
to influence the reader’s beliefs, the EVIDENCE 
relation may be employed.  This intended effect 
adds to the complexity of the logical structure of 
the argument.  This occurs in Frege’s argument 
against the claim that numbers are merely ideas 
without objective reality, introduced earlier.  
Frege’s argument, shown in Figure 1, relies on 
modus tollens for its validity.   EVIDENCE is used 
to link the argument’s  premises to the conclusion.  
As specified by the definition of modus tollens, the 
argument starts with a conditional premise: 
If number were an idea, then arithmetic would 
be psychology,   
followed by a categorical premise that denies the 
consequent of the conditional premise, 
But arithmetic is no more psychology than, 
say, astronomy is, 
and a conclusion that infers the denial of the 
antecedent of the conditional premise: 
I cannot agree with Schloemilch…when he 
calls number the idea of the position of an item 
in a series.  
The relational proposition for the Frege analysis,  
evidence(concession(condition(p,q),r),s) 
generalizes to the logical expression: 
((((((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)  ¬((p → q) → q)) 
→ ¬q) → ¬p)  (((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)  
¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q)) → ¬p) 
Any analysis that matches this generalized 
signature will be an instantiation of the modus 
tollens rule of inference.  That this is so is 
supported in part by the signature’s derivation from 
an exemplar of modus tollens, and is further 
supported, as will be discussed in detail in Section 
9, by the realization that the rule of inference is 
deducible from the signature.  That is to say, for 
any such argument, the canonical rule is logically 
implicit within the RST analysis, and therefore 
within the text. 
7 Biconditional Modus Tollens 
The CONDITION relation sometimes represents a 
biconditional logical relation.  This is apparent in 
part from the definition of the relation as specified 
by Mann and Thompson (1987), that realization of 
the situation presented in the nucleus (the 
consequent) depends upon the realization of the 
situation presented in the satellite (the antecedent), 
and it is also observable in the text they used as 
their example of the relation:  
N: Employees are urged to complete new 
beneficiary designation forms for retirement or 
life insurance benefits 
S: whenever there is a change in marital or 
family status. 
A change in marital or family status is the 
condition under which employees are urged to 
complete new beneficiary designation forms. The 
reader recognizes that the realization of the nucleus 
depends on the realization of satellite.  If there is 
no change in status, there is no need to complete 
new forms.  If the satellite remains unrealized, so 
will the nucleus.  Thus, the relation is biconditional 
(s « n). 
Occurrences of the biconditional as modus 
tollens may employ the counterfactual in the 
antecedent.   The counterfactual contains the denial 
of the antecedent within the antecedent itself.  In 
the example shown in Figure 3, Donald Trump 
argues that if he wanted to win the war in 
Afghanistan,  he could do so within a week.  The 
counterfactuality of the antecedent indicates that he 
does not wish to do so, with the implication that we 
therefore cannot do so.  This interpretation leads to 
a relational proposition defined not only on the 
basis of the explicit rhetorical structure, but the 
implicit relations as well: 
condition(conjunction(condition(1,2),[3]),[4]) 
which normalizes to the biconditional modus 
tollens: (((p ↔ q)  ¬p) → ¬q).  When the 
 





normalization process indicates denial of the 
antecedent, the charitable interpretation will be that 
the CONDITION relation is being used as 
biconditionally.  Not only may the denial of the 
antecedent be implicit, the consequent itself may 
be implicit.  Incomplete conditionals such as  
1. If only Miss Hawkins would get a job…  
have an implicit implicative potentiality.  While 
this example leaves much to the reader’s 
imagination, with assistance from context provided 
by the writer, or from the reader’s world 
knowledge (Elder & Savva, 2018),  a pragmatic 
conjecture such as  
2. [then surely her situation would be 
improved.] 
3. [But, alas, she has not gotten a job.] 
4. [And so her situation remains unimproved.] 
seems plausible, and results in the relational 
complex: 
cause(concession(condition(1,[2]),[3]),[4]) 
As constructed, the inference relies on denying the 
antecedent.  Hence it is another example of 
biconditional modus tollens.  However, the logic 
differs from the previous example, due to the use 
of the cause predicate instead of condition.  The 
cause predicate has the same logical form as 
evidence, and as such is used to link the argument’s 
premises to the conclusion.  Clearly, however, the 
more fragmentary the information, the greater the 
risks of conjecture, and the greater risk of false 
positives.   
8 Antithetical Modus Tollens 
ANTITHESIS is used as part of a modus tollens 
relational complex in a manner rhetorically similar 
to CONCESSION.  This is perhaps owing to the 
similarity of the two relations (Stede, 2008).  In the 
example shown in Figure 4, the structure follows 
the familiar pattern of modus tollens, but now the 
CONDITION is a satellite of the ANTITHESIS rather 
than of CONCESSION.  The logical form, and hence 
the signature, is disjunctive syllogism,  
((((p → q)  ¬q)  ¬(p → q)) → ¬q) 
Thus ANTITHESIS, when the satellite is conditional, 
is modus tollens.  Alternatively, the CAUSE relation 
may be used as satellite to the ANTITHESIS relation, 
as shown in Figure 5.  This text is interesting in 
several respects.  From the logical perspective, 
there are arguments within arguments such that the 
consequences of one become the condition of 
another.  And counterfactual conditionality is used 
to implement a strategy of reductio ad absurdum, 
such that the conclusion of the text indicates its 
own negation.  Logic mining is useful in sorting 
this out. The text divides conveniently into two 
parts.  Units 1-3 implement the causal variety of 
antithetical modus tollens: 
((((((p → q)  p) → q)  r)  ¬(((p → q)  
p) → q)) → r) 
That this is an occurrence of antithetical modus 
tollens can be realized by evaluating the causal 
argument to obtain its result, q, so that the 
expression becomes 
(((q  r)  ¬q) → r) 
which when normalized becomes a signature for 
antithetical modus tollens: 
(((p  q)  ¬p) → q) 
As discussed below in Section 9, modus tollens is 
provable using disjunctive syllogism.  An 
alternative approach would be to realize that if ((p 
→ q)  p), as indicated by CAUSE, then the 
CONDITION (p → q) holds as well.  The same 
approach can be used for segments 3-5. The if-then 
statement of 3-4 is coded as a RESULT, because it 
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is the antecedent of the condition that is salient in 
this text.  Segment 3, or r, situated conditionally 
within the argument, is the negation of “that is not 
the case.” The consequent, provided in 4-5, 
provides the reductio ad absurdum.   That is, if 
“that were the case,” untenable results would 
follow. 
9 The Significance of Signatures 
The question will arise as to the significance of 
logical signatures.  Are they grounded in 
identifiable logical relationships with their 
respective rules of inference, or is the 
correspondence between signatures and rules 
simply a happy coincidence?  Both signatures and 
rules are valid arguments, both share the same 
elementary propositions, and both reach the same 
conclusion.  It would therefore be useful to 
determine whether the rules of inference are 
deducible from the signatures, and if not, what the 
nature of the relationship is.  So now we can 
examine each the signatures introduced above and 
determine their relationship to modus tollens.  The 
signatures to be considered include canonical, 
evidential, biconditional, and antithetical modus 
tollens.  For canonical modus tollens, the signature 
maps directly to the inference rule; it is indeed 
simply a statement of the rule, (((p → q)  ¬q) → 
¬p).  Evidential modus tollens is a more interesting 
case.  It has already been shown that the logical 
signature for  
evidence(concession(condition(p,q),r),s) 
is 
((((((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)  ¬((p → q) → q)) 
→ ¬q) → ¬p)  (((¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q)  
¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q)) → ¬p) 
This expression contains two occurrences of the 
valid argument 
(¬((p → q) → q) → ¬q) 
We evaluate and replace those occurrences with 
their consequent, ¬q, resulting in   
(((((¬q  ¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q) → ¬p)  
((¬q  ¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q)) → ¬p) 
which contains two occurrences of the valid 
argument 
((¬q  ¬((p → q) → q)) → ¬q) 
for which we also substitute the consequent, ¬q, 
resulting in the valid argument 
(((¬q → ¬p)  ¬q) → ¬p) 
for which the implicant 
((¬q → ¬p)  ¬q) 
is materially equivalent to the implicant of modus 
tollens: 
((¬q → ¬p)  ¬q) ↔ ((p → q)  ¬q) 
Thus the evidential interpretation effectively 
reduces to modus tollens.  This is applicable to the 
logical forms of each of the modus ponens 
presentational relations, including BACKGROUND, 
ENABLEMENT, EVIDENCE, JUSTIFY, MOTIVATION, 
and PREPARATION, as well as the causal relations.  
The presentational version of biconditional 




((((((¬((p ↔ q) → p) → ¬p)  ¬((p ↔ q) → p)) 
→ ¬p) → ¬q)  (((¬((p ↔ q) → p) → ¬p)  
¬((p ↔ q) → p)) → ¬p)) → ¬q) 
The modus ponens 
(((¬((p ↔ q) → p) → ¬p)  ¬((p ↔ q) → p)) → 
¬p) 
occurs twice within this expression.  Replacing this 
with its consequent,  ¬p, yields 
(((¬p → ¬q)  ¬p) → ¬q) 
which is modus tollens.  This is applicable to 
biconditional occurrences of the same RST 
relations as evidential modus tollens, except that 
the categorical premise normalizes to the negation 
of the antecedent of the conditional premise, rather 
than the consequent.  It is by this means that this 
biconditional modus tollens can be distinguished 
from evidential modus tollens. 
The relational proposition of antithetical modus 
tollens is antithesis(condition(p,q),r) for which the 
generalized signature is  
((((p → q)  ¬q)  ¬(p → q)) → ¬q) 
Since one of the proofs of modus tollens is based 
on disjunctive syllogism, it can be shown that 
modus tollens follows from the normalized 




syllogism, ((¬p  q)  ¬q), implies (p → q), so 
that if it is the case that 
(((¬p  q)  ¬q) → (p → q)) 
it follows that both the premise and the conclusion 
hold, 
(((¬p  q)  ¬q)  (p → q)) 
and it is a tautology that  
 (((¬p  q)  ¬q)  (p → q)) ↔  
((p → q)  ¬q) 
Thus, modus tollens may be inferred from the 
logical signature for antithesis(condition(p,q),r). 
And thus, the evidential, biconditional, and 
antithetical signatures can be used, not only to 
discover instances of modus tollens in discourse, 
they are grounded in the rule of inference they are 
designed to detect.   
10 Conclusion  
This exploration of modus tollens has shown how 
relational propositions can be used to support 
discourse logic-mining using logical signatures as 
a means for discovering occurrences of standard 
rules of inference in discourse.  In addition to 
modus tollens, several other signatures that serve 
as indicators of rules of inference have been noted.  
EVIDENCE and other pragmatic and causal 
relations map directly to modus ponens, and 
ANTITHESIS implements disjunctive syllogism.  
Further research is needed to determine what 
additional signatures can be identified.  These 
would provide a rich set of resources for logic-
mining discourse and reduce the need for ad hoc 
procedures for inference rule identification and 
would eventually support a greater capability for 
automated analysis. 
Automated identification of inference rules 
within discourse would require development and 
integration of several capabilities.  Although there 
has been significant work in automated detection 
of RST relations (e.g., Corston-Oliver, 1998; 
Hernault et al., 2010; Pardo et al., 2004; Soricut & 
Marcu, 2003), such a capability would need to 
generate output as nested relational propositions of 
complex structures.  Prototype software already 
exists for generating logical expressions from 
nested relational propositions of arbitrary size and 
complexity (Potter, 2018).  A unification algorithm 
could be used for identifying instantiations of 
inference rules in nested relational propositions.  
The generalized signatures would subsume 
instances of inference rules in a relational 
proposition. Subsumption would succeed when the 
proposition contains a logical structure isomorphic 
with the signature.  The signature would need to 
match both simple and composite spans, so that 
instantiation could occur at any level within the 
structure. 
Using RST as the starting point for inference 
rule discovery simplifies the task, but also delimits 
it.  These delimitations arise not so much the result 
of well-known concerns about the validity of RST 
(e.g., Asher & Lascarides, 2003; Budzynska et al., 
2016; Grosz & Sidner, 1986; Knott, Oberlander, 
O'Donnell, & Mellish, 2001; Moore & Pollack, 
1992; Sanders, Spooren, & Noordman, 1992; 
Webber, Stone, Joshi, & Knott, 2003; Wiebe, 1993; 
Wolf & Gibson, 2005), but out of a fundamental 
feature of the theory—namely that it is a theory of 
coherence relations.  Perhaps this delimitation is an 
asset.  By basing the concept of logic-mining on a 
theory of coherence relations, it is by definition 
constrained to discursive inferences discoverable 
within a text.  The granularity of analysis being at 
the clausal level, the inferences discoverable 
among these clauses are propositional.  A benefit 
of this is that many problems in natural language 
inferencing, such as those described by Lakoff 
(1970), van Benthem (2008),  MacCartney (2009) 
and Karttunen (2015), e.g., determining logical 
relationships among arbitrarily selected assertions, 
are avoided.  They are avoided not because they do 
not exist, for indeed they do, but because they need 
not come to the surface.  A practical solution for 
logic-mining texts for rules of inference should be 
both useful and interesting, and perhaps the 
techniques arising from this work will contribute to 
solving grander challenges.  For now, the essence 
of logic-mining is that from a text, it is possible to 
identify a rhetorical structure, and from the 
structure, a relational proposition, and from the 
relational proposition, a generalized logical 
signature, and from the signature, the rule of 
inference residing within the text. 
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